OpenAPI 3.0 spec for the de-id transforms with concrete request/response
schemas, both /tokenize and /restore, an x-api-key securityScheme for
backend-direct calls, and both servers (backend custom domain + Fusion listener,
which injects the key).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fusion couldn't resolve the default *.execute-api.amazonaws.com endpoint, so front
the same HTTP API with hncb-deid.apim-apac-demo.com (ACM DNS-validated cert,
apigatewayv2 REGIONAL custom domain, root api mapping, Route53 A ALIAS). Callers
resolve our hostname straight to IPs and never touch an execute-api name; also
survives API-id churn. Point POLICY_SETUP + README demo at the custom URLs.
Verified live: resolves to IPs, 401 unauthenticated, tokenizes with the key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an Amazon Bedrock Guardrail (PROMPT_ATTACK, HIGH, input) plus a dedicated
least-privilege IAM user for Fusion's AWS-Guardrail integration, so the gateway
screens inbound prompts for injection/jailbreak before de-id or the agent run.
Outputs the region/id/version/access-key for the Fusion console (secret stays in
gitignored state). Verified live: benign -> NONE, injection -> GUARDRAIL_INTERVENED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Position /tokenize + /restore as the transform backend of an inline request/
response policy on the route to the AgentCore agent, with Fusion as the
non-bypassable enforcement + audit point — rather than a manual HTTP
orchestrator. Adds an honest Fusion-vs-/demo governance note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Build the AWS side of the HNCB demo end to end (region ap-southeast-1):
- T1 /tokenize + T2 /restore: Lambdas behind a public API Gateway (shared-secret
auth), Presidio detection, random per-request tokens, DynamoDB vault; overlap
resolution so a ROC ID stays TW_ROC_ID.
- T3: Presidio made private (SG-locked to the tokenize Lambda in-VPC; DynamoDB
gateway endpoint); only /tokenize + /restore are public.
- T4: RAG Lambda registered as an MCP tool on an AgentCore Gateway (AWS_IAM/SigV4);
agentcore_setup.sh + a SigV4 MCP invoke test.
- T5: Strands agent deployed to AgentCore Runtime; SigV4 gateway auth, apac
inference profile, pinned deps.
- T6: advisor UI on S3+CloudFront with a Fusion-less demo orchestrator (/demo)
chaining tokenize -> runtime -> restore.
- T7: README runbook + trace check; teardown deletes gateway/runtime/memory/ECR.
Verified live: the cloud AgentCore/Bedrock trace shows only tokens, never the
real name. Secrets stay in gitignored local.auto.tfvars.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
